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COMPETITION LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN THE FACE OF THE NEW SINGLE
CURRENCY MARKET
REBECCA SCHOENFELDT*

INTRODUCTION

The name "Gucci" usually inspires images of fashion,
runways, photographers, and supermodels. Recently, however,
the Italian fashion house's name has been in the news, not for its
new designs, but for its continued efforts to stave off a takeover
attempt.1 Starting in January 1999, Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton
[hereinafter LVMH], the world's largest maker of luxury goods,
run by French billionaire Bernard Arnault, bought up large
amounts of Gucci stock to bring LVMH's holdings in Gucci from
In an
less than five percent to over thirty-four percent.!
unexpected defensive dodge, Gucci offered its employees money to
buy up to thirty-seven million new shares of stock that the
corporation issued.3 The employees used the money to buy twenty
million shares, equaling LVMH's shares, so that LVMH's stake in
Gucci was reduced to twenty-six percent.4
LVMH took the matter to a Netherlands court, arguing that
Gucci's activities abused shareholder rights. 5 Gucci accused
LVMH of using what is commonly known as a "creeping takeover,"
which is illegal in some countries because of the effects it has on
stockholders.6 In this type of takeover, a hostile corporation buys a
J.D. Candidate, June 2001.
1. Hugo Dixon, Europe's New Frontier,FIN. TIMES LTD. (London), Apr. 16,
1999, at 17.
2. Leslie Kaufman & Constance C. R. White, Velvet Fisticuffs: High
Fashion, High Stakes in LVMH-Gucci Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1999,

at C1.
3. Id. Gucci pointed to the fact that LVMH is its competitor as the reason
that it did not want LVMH holding a stake in the corporation. Amy Barrett,
Gucci ParriesLVMH With Share Move, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1999, at 2.
Gucci compared it to "Coke having a seat on Pepsi's board." Id.
4. Kaufman & White, supra note 2, at C1.
5. Id.
6. Id. The shareholders are harmed because they do not receive due
compensation for the effects on the corporation. Id. In a creeping takeover,
the hostile corporation buys enough stock to have a majority, but does not
make an offer to actually take over the whole corporation. PATRICK A.
GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 216
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majority stake in the corporation it is seeking to take over, but it
does not make an offer to the shareholders for all of the stock.7
Instead, the hostile corporation seeks to take control of the target
corporation with just a majority stake, and without having to pay
for all the extra shares of circulating stock.8 However, in the Gucci
situation, the Dutch court sided with LVMH and dismissed Gucci's
accusations.'
Gucci then tried to keep the corporation out of LVMH's hands
by quickly forming a deal with another French billionaire,
Francois Pinault of Pinault Printemps Redoute. ° In return for
Gucci selling a forty-two-percent stake in the corporation to him,
which further reduced LVMH's stake to under twenty-percent, Mr.
Pinault promised to help Gucci become a major competitor of
LVMH. 1'
LVMH countered by asking the Dutch courts to
invalidate the deal. However, at the end of May 1999, the court
ruled in Gucci's favor, thus ending the fight for control of the
fashion house.12
(1996).

Comparatively, in a normal takeover situation, after the hostile

corporation has purchased stock, it will make an offer to the company and
other shareholders to buy the rest of the stock at a certain price per share. Id.
Since the target corporation in a takeover situation is usually run by the new
corporation, it is fair for the hostile corporation to compensate the
stockholders for the loss of the company in which they invested their money.
Id.
7. Kaufman & White, supra note 2, at C1. See John Tagliabue, Feintsand
Parries Aplenty in the Battle for Gucci, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1999, at C2
(discussing Mr. Arnault's strategy and Gucci's defensive moves).
8. Tagliabue, supra note 7, at C2. Mr. Arnault said that LVMH did not
make an offer to buy the whole corporation because of the risk. John
Carreyrou, LVMH's Arnault Wants Louis-Vuitton-Gucci Alliance, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Mar. 18, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Euronews Database.
Mr. Arnault said that although Gucci has recently made "strides," it "has yet
to completely live up to its potential." Id.
9. Tagliabue, supra note 7, at C2. The Dutch court also ordered "good
faith" negotiations between LVMH and Gucci on a possible bid by LVMH.
Thomas Kamm, When It Comes to Takeovers, Europe Isn't Unified, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 23, 1999, at A12.
10. Tagliabue, supra note 7, at C2.
11. Id. After Mr. Pinault entered the picture, LVMH offered different bid
scenarios, depending on whether the court would invalidate the deal made
with Mr. Pinault. Battling LVMH, Gucci Officials to Meet as Key Court
Hearing Begins, DOW JONES ONLINE NEWS, Apr. 21, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, Euronews Database [hereinafter Battling LVMH].
12. John Tagliabue, Court Rules Against LVMH in Battle Over Gucci, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1999, at C1. LVMH argued that Gucci should have asked for
its shareholders' approval before issuing the employee stock option plan and
selling a majority stake to Mr. Pinault. Battling LVMH, supra note 11. The
court upheld the alliance with Mr. Pinault, but ordered Gucci to abandon the
employee stock option plan. LVMH/Suits -3: Also Seeking Damages From
Gucci, PPR, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., June 9, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, Euronews Database. Just recently, Pinault of Gucci and Arnault
of LVMH dropped their libel lawsuits against each other, but many bad
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Several other corporations
in the European Union
[hereinafter EU] 3 have also recently faced hostile takeover
attempts. 4 Some attribute the origin of this trend to the
introduction of the "euro, 11 the currency that will soon be used

feelings still exist over the deal. World Business Briefing: Europe; Libel Suits
Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1999, at C2. Since the case ended, Gucci's
shareholders overwhelmingly voted to approve the deal with Mr. Pinault.
Glenn Drexhage, Deals of the Year 1999: Most Innovative Deal: Winner:
Gucci/PPR (vs. LVMH), CORP. FIN., Dec. 1, 1999, at 53. Also, Gucci has
acquired Sanofi Beaute, the corporation that controls brands such as Saint
Laurent and Fendi, and has been talking with the Italian shoemaker
corporation Sergio Rossi about a possible acquisition. Thomas Kamm &
Charles Fleming, Italian Luxury Firm to Pay $952 Million in Effort to Better
Rival LVMH, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A25. LVMH has since launched a
takeover bid on the Italian fashion house Stefanel SpA. French Giant
PreparesTakeover Bid on Stefanel (I colosso francese, dopo lo scacco su Gucci,
prepara un'Opa per l'azienda veneta), IL SOLE 24 ORE, Oct. 7, 1999, available
in WESTLAW, Euronews Database.
13. The EU, originally known as the European Economic Community
[hereinafter EEC] was formed by the 1957 Treaty of Rome in order to develop
a common market between all the Member States. Uwe Blaurock, Steps
Toward a Uniform CorporateLaw in the European Union, 31 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 377, 378 (1998). The six original members of the EEC were Belgium,
France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.

RALPH H.

FOLSOM ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE AND

INVESTMENT IN A NUTSHELL 265 (1996). In 1973, they were joined by
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Id. Greece joined in 1981, Spain
and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members in
1995. Id. There are a number of other countries who are now trying to join
the EU, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Hungary. Id. at
266. The Community was originally established under the name "European
Economic Community," but the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht officially shortened
the name to the "European Community" [hereinafter ECI. VALENTINE KORAH,
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (6th ed.
1997). However, the Treaty of Maastricht also refers to the EC as a Union,
because the Community now embraces interests other than purely economics;
therefore, the name "European Union" is used more frequently when referring
to the union of Member States. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 6 (4th ed. 1998).
14. Dixon, supra note 1, at 17. Olivetti, an Italian technology and
telecommunications group, has made a hostile bid for Telecom Italia, another
telecommunications group, and two French banks, Societe Generale and
Paribas, are in danger of a takeover by the Banque Nationale de Paris. Id.
Additionally, two Italian banks, UniCredito and SanPaola IMI, are attempting
takeovers of two other Italian banks, Banca Commerciale Italiana and Banca
di Roma.
Id.; see also Robin Sidel, Poison Pill Kills the 'Pac-Man',
BIRMINGHAM POST, July 31, 1999, at 21 (describing the hostile bid and
counterbid between rival French oil companies Elf Aquitaine and TotalFina);
Unicredito ItalianoBids $16.4 Billion for Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1999, at
C2 (discussing further information about the takeover attempt of Banca
Commerciale Italiana by Unicredito Italiano).
15. The "euro" is the name of the uniform EU currency that has been
introduced into the market and will eventually replace the individual
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throughout the"' EU.' 6 The euro has inspired a new form of
of "previously foreign
capitalism in Europe that includes the use
17
techniques," such as the hostile takeover.
Besides changing the face of European business, these
takeover attempts have exposed inconsistencies between the laws
of the various EU countries. 8 Accordingly, there have been
discussions about developing a single EU takeover regime. 9
However, in the debate over governmental intervention, the
prevalent notion among the EU countries is that it is best for the
governments to stand on the sidelines and avoid involvement.2 °

currencies of all the participating EU countries.

PAUL BEAUMONT & NEIL
WALKER, LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY 17 (1999).

Of the 15 countries currently belonging to the EU, 11 adopted the euro as
their form of currency on January 1, 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Id. at 7, 17. However, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
are keeping their own currencies. Id. at 7. The countries adopting the euro
will continue to accept the currencies of the other countries until 2002. Id. at
17. Although the EU is not physically using the euro yet, it is being valued in
relation to other currencies, and therefore its adoption has had the effect of
erasing country borders and facilitating the new hostile takeover trend, which
has rarely been seen before in European business.
16. Dixon, supra note 1, at 17. Before the introduction of the euro, each
country had a largely independent market. Id. Because of risk factors, such
as currency valuation risk, not much inter-investment activity existed among
the private sectors of different European countries. Id. However, the single
currency has now alleviated many of those risks, and a new "Americanized"
form of capitalism is quickly arising. Id. This form favors returns and
increases in shareholder wealth over control of the relatively small market.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The Gucci and LVMH case presents examples of this. In the
Netherlands, it is very difficult to accomplish a takeover because under Dutch
law, companies can use a variety of defensive measures, such as issuing new
shares without getting shareholder approval and stripping shares of voting
powers. Kamm, supra note 9, at A12. There is "no obligation to launch a bid."
Id. By comparison, France requires a corporation to launch a bid as soon as it
reaches a 33% stake in the target corporation, and another corporation, such
as Mr. Pinault's PPR, can only come in through a counterbid. Id. Thus,
although Mr. Pinault and Mr. Arnault were both Frenchmen, they could take
advantage of the liberal Dutch laws and act in ways that would be illegal in
their own country. Id. This is because, under EU law, the individual Member
States can have their own laws as long as they do not conflict with the EU
laws.
Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REv. 343, 354-55 (1997). During the takeover battle,
LVMH complained about the lack of uniform regulations, saying, "[wie build a
single market with a single currency, and at the same time, we let an Italian
company use Dutch law to defend itself from a French company." Kamm,
supra note 9, at A12. This statement clearly demonstrates the problem: while
Europe has taken so many steps to unify itself and form uniform regulations,
somehow the takeover rules have slipped through the cracks.
19. Dixon, supra note 1, at 17.
20. Id. In France and Italy, the governments initially took sides in the
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Still, the EU countries are currently negotiating to develop a
directive to harmonize takeover laws.2 '
Part I of this Comment discusses the current competition
laws of the EU. Part II analyzes EU competition law,
demonstrating how the laws are applied and discussing situations
Part III
in which national competition laws would apply.
discusses the problems with the current national competition laws
and the lack of uniformity among the Member States. Part IV
proposes an amendment to the current EU competition laws that
would act to regulate the recent boom in hostile takeovers of
corporate Europe.
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAWS: A BACKGROUND
The EU was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, with
the stated purpose of "establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and...implementing.. .common
policies or activities... to promote throughout the Community a
of
economic
development
balanced
and
harmonious
solidarity
and
social
cohesion
and
economic
activities.. .and
among [M emberO States. " ' One of the activities that the Treaty
set forth in order to accomplish these goals was the development of
a legal system that would promote and regulate competition in the
Competition has long been an important
corporate realm. 3
I.

recent takeover attempts of the banks, but have now backed off in the
apparent belief that "they should not prevent shareholders [from] having their
say." Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the takeover
attempts of French and Italian banks); see also Keep Takeovers Out of the

Courts, THE LAWYER, Apr. 26, 1999, at 14 (discussing efforts to unify
European takeover laws, but pointing out possible problems throughout the

EU due to the ever-present conflicts between the United Kingdom's common
law and other European countries' civil law systems); Hilary Clark, Spain
Blocks UK's Merger Reform, INDEP. (London), June 20, 1999, at 1 (discussing

Britain's original objections to the directive, Germany's compromise, and
Spain's problems with the effects of the compromise).

21. Clark, supra note 20, at 1. The Commission has in the past few years
been trying to come up with a set of uniform rules, but cannot reach a
consensus, and have the added problem that some of the Member States don't
want their laws changed by a new set of EU rules. Kamm, supra note 9, at
A12.

See also Dixon, supra note 1, at 17 (reporting that Germany has

proposed to "unblock the European takeover directive").
22. THE TREATY OF ROME CONSOLIDATED AND THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT

1, 588 (Neville March Hunnings & Joe MacDonald Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter
TREATY CONSOLIDATED] (citing Article 2 of the EC Treaty, Maastricht

Version). Article 3 continues by explaining the activities that will accomplish
the purposes of Article 2, which include "(a) the elimination, as between
Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the
import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect;
(b) a common commercial policy; (c) ... the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital .... " Id.
23. Id. at 589. This was originally section (f) of Article 3 of the Treaty of
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method of promoting the goals of the EU; it increases economic
activity between the Member States and strengthens the economic
power of the EU in the world market.24
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome and its progeny, the
Treaty of Maastricht,25 set forth the laws governing competition in
the EU.26 Article 85(1) prohibits "... all agreements between
undertakings... and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member[]States and which have as their object or effect,
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market. . 27 Article 86 prohibits "[any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it... in so far as it may affect
trade between [M]ember[]States."'
In the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht, the term
"competition" is never actually defined.29
However, these
competition laws apply whenever freedom of trade may be
affected. 0 In order to better understand the competition laws and
Rome, but was relettered section (g) in the Treaty of Maastricht. Id.
24. LuCIE A. CARSWELL & XAVIER DE SARRAU, LAW & BUSINESS IN THE

EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET 14-4 (1993).
25. The Treaty of Maastricht was enacted in 1992 and came into effect in
November of 1993, due to the changing needs resulting from the process of
integration of the Member States. HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 7. The Treaty
of Maastricht follows the same format as the Treaty of Rome.
26. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626; see also CARSWELL & DE
SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-4 (noting that competition is an important
means of encouraging economic activity and market integration within the
Community).
27. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626.
28. Id. at 627.
29. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines competition as "the struggle
between two rivals for the same trade at the same time; the act of seeking or
endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (6th ed. 1990). Competition is the natural
relationship between two or more undertakings who buy or sell the same
goods or services, which includes a rivalry with those in the same market,
whether a small community market or the world market. D.G. GOYDER, EC
COMPETITION LAW 9 (3d ed. 1998).
30. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 9. If a possible threat to trade exists among
the Member States, then the competition laws will apply. CARSWELL & DE
SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-6. There are four situations in which a threat to
the freedom of trade will trigger the application of the competition laws: 1) if
the agreement in question "applies directly or indirectly" to more than one
Member State; 2) if the parties reside in different Member States; 3) if the
parties conduct business in different Member States; or 4) if the property
affected is traded, "or likely to be traded, between [M]ember-States." Id. Once
Article 85 is triggered, "[tihe prohibition.., is immediate when the probable
effect of an agreement between undertakings is an appreciable distortion of
competition within the common market which may affect trade between
[Miember[] [Sitates." Spencer Weber Waller & Noel J. Byrne, Changing View
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law in the European Community and
the United States of America, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1993).
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how they work, it is first necessary to look at the dynamics of
Articles 85 and 86 separately, and then to discuss the Merger
Regulation, which was enacted more recently.
A. Article 85
In forming the EU, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established four
centralizing institutions, each independent of the others."a The
two institutions that are most pertinent to the subject of this
Comment are the European Court of Justice and the Commission.
The European Court of Justice is responsible for ensuring that the
laws of the EU are observed in all activities throughout the EU.32
To do so, it reviews the legality of acts and regulations that are put
into effect by the Commission.33
The Commission is responsible for ensuring that EU
countries comply with the provisions in these acts and
regulations.3
The Commission also proposes and drafts EU
legislation and forwards it to the Council, which reviews the
legislation and consults with the Parliament before enacting the
legislation.' The Commission also plays an important role in the
area of competition law. The Commission is responsible for
reviewing and issuing decisions regarding whether an activity falls
within the Articles on competition. 6
The European Court of Justice and the Commission look at
Article 85 differently than an American court would.3 7 Instead of
paying close attention to the exact wording of the Article, the
Court and Commission look more to the underlying purpose of the
law.3" Despite the Court's methodology, however, a complete
31. H. Thomas Hefti, European Union Competition Law, 18 SETON HALL

LEGIS. J. 613, 614 (1994). The Treaty established a Council, a Commission, a
European Parliment and a Court of Justice. Id. The Council usually consists
of the ministers of each Member State, and each is responsible for the issues of

their own State. Id. The European Parliament consists of elected members
who deal with the budget, EU legislation, international agreements and
treaties, and the admittance of new Member States. Id. at 615.
32. Id. at 615-16.
33. Id. The Court of Justice is based in Luxembourg and is comprised of 15
Justices who are appointed for six-year terms by the Member States. FOLSOM

ET AL., supra note 13, at 280. The Court is separate from the other three EU
institutions and the individual Member States. Id. at 281. All EU affairs are
within the province of the Court. Id. at 282. The Court also has the final say
over all EU matters in the national courts. Id.
34. Hefti, supra note 31, at 615.

35. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 13, at
Brussels, Belgium, and is comprised of
appointed by the Council. Id. at 272-73.
France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the

274. The Commission is located in
20 members who are selected and
There are two Commissioners from
U.K., and one Commissioner from

each other Member State. Id. at 273.

36. Hefti, supra note 31, at 615; FOLSOM ETAL., supra note 13, at 273-74.
37. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 75.
38. Id. The purpose of EU law is to create a unified market and
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understanding of Article 85 still requires a basic examination of its
wording.
The first important concept in Article 85(1) requires the
involvement of "undertakings."3 9'
European courts define an
undertaking broadly to include any organization, from State
bodies to publicly-owned associations to private individuals to
corporations, that is involved in "an exchange of economic
values... . 4o To be an undertaking, however, the organization
must be able to assume legal rights and duties and be able to
contract with other organizations.4
The second element in Article 85(1) requires the undertakings
to enter into an "agreement[U," a "concerted practice[," or a
"decision U."' European courts have held that an "agreement"
exists when there is a sufficient understanding between two
undertakings concerning a bargain. 3 A "decision" is relatively
easy to recognize. It is a situation where an association of
undertakings makes rules or recommendations, even if they are
not binding on the individual undertakings making the decision."
community, and thus competition must be in line with this same goal.
Spencer Weber Waller, Understandingand AppreciatingEC CompetitionLaw,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 56 (1992).
39. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626.
40. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 87. However, the goal of the organization
does not need to be profit; instead, it is the nature of the activities that are
analyzed when determining whether an act is an "undertaking." Id. For
example, in SAT v. Eurocontrol, an international organization that controlled
air traffic over most of Europe was held to have activities "more like those of a
public authority than an economic concern," and so was not an undertaking.
Id. at 87-88 (discussing Case C-364192, SAT v. Eurocontrol, 1994 E.C.R. 1-43, 5
C.M.L.R. 208 (1994)). In another borderline case, Federation Francaisedes
Societes d'Assurance, a French insurance company that managed a non-profit
pension fund was held to be an undertaking because it competed with other
insurance companies and managed the fund as private insurance companies
do. Id. at 88 (discussing Case C-244/94, FederationFrancaise des Societes'
d'Assurance, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4013, 4 C.M.L.R. 536 (1996)). Thus, in these close
cases, it seems that the organization's commercial activities are compared
with its public service activities to determine whether there is an undertaking;
if the commercial activities are more pronounced, then the organization is
likely to be classified as an undertaking. Id. at 88-89. Also, when there are
several organizational bodies that form a group with pronounced commercial
activities, each body within that group is held to be a separate undertaking.
Id. at91.
41. Id. at 87.
42. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626.
43. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 93.
The agreement must be made
voluntarily by each party. Id. Yet, the agreement does not have to be legally
binding as long as both parties acted as though there was an agreement; nor is
there a requirement that the agreement be in writing. CARSWELL & DE
SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-11. The courts can look to the facts and
surrounding circumstances to determine whether an agreement was indeed
reached. Id.
44. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-12.
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The term "concerted practices" covers activities that are not
extensive enough to constitute an agreement or a decision.45
The third element of Article 85(1) is that the trade among
Member States be "affect[ed]."' European courts have interpreted
the term "trade" broadly. 7 The concept includes commercial
activities, services, and exchanges with other European countries
who may or may not be members of the EU." This trade between
Member States will be "affected" if an activity has a considerable
impact on market conditions.49
Finally, for an agreement to be prohibited under Article 85(1),
it must have "as [its] object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market.. . ."o These
restrictions can be either horizontal or vertical,5 as long as they
restrict competition. 2 To fall under the provisions of the Article,

45. Id. A concerted practice is defined by the Court of Justice as "a form of
cooperation between undertakings which... knowingly substitutes practical
cooperation between them for the risks of competition." Id. Unusual behavior,
such as the trading of information between competitors, may indicate that the
undertakings have "acted in concert." Id. at 14-12 to 14-13.
46. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626.
47. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 115.
48. Id. Trade includes "manufactur[ing] and distribution, ... banking,
financial services[,] the provision of exhibitions and trade
insurance ....
fairs, .. television [shows], sport[s events], and other cultural activities." Id.
49. Id. at 116. As a prerequisite, an undertaking must have at least a five
percent market share for horizontal agreements, and a ten percent share for
vertical agreements. Id. at 110. See infra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying
text for descriptions and examples of horizontal and vertical agreements. The
standard for reviewing whether trade is affected is whether the agreement, as
a whole, will likely have such an effect. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 111.
50. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626. Article 85 lists five
examples of agreements that will be held to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition within the common market if they do any of the following:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling
prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations, which by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
Id. at 626-27. However, these five situations are only examples, and are not
meant to be a complete or exclusive list. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 121.
51. See CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-13. Horizontal
undertakings are "at the same level of production or distribution," whereas
vertical undertakings are at different levels, an example being franchisor and
franchisee. Id.
52. Id. Examples of horizontal restrictions include "price-fixing, marketsharing, and information exchange." Id. Vertical restrictions include export
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the agreement must either intend to restrict competition or
actually do so." If all four elements of Article 85(1) are present,
then Section (2) of the Article states that the competitive
agreements or decisions affecting trade "[are] automatically
void. " '
However, 85(3) allows the Commission to grant an
exemption for certain agreements that are prohibited under
Section (1)."'
Four conditions must be met for an agreement to qualify for
the exemption under Section (3) of Article 85.56 The agreement,
decision, or concerted practice must: 1) contribute "to improving
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or
economic progress. . .. 57 The agreement, decision, or concerted
practice must also 2) "allowU consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit. . . ."58 However, the agreement cannot 3) "impose
on the undertakings... restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives [already referred to]," or 4)
"afford [the] undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question." 9 In order to qualify for the exemption, the answer to

prohibitions and restrictions on parallel imports. Id.
53. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 120. The Court has stated that it first looks
to the object or purpose of the agreement; only if it is not restrictive on its face
is it necessary to look at the effect it has on competition. Id.
54. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626-27.
55. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-27; TREATY
CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626-27. The Commission has the sole power
to decide whether to grant an exemption; even when the national courts have
jurisdiction, they can only determine whether section (1) has been violated.
CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-27, 14-29. However, to qualify
for the exemption, either the Commission must be notified of the agreement,
or a restrictive agreement must be "drafted to comply with the terms of a block
exemption regulation." Id.
56. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 136; TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22,
at 627.
57. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 627. The first condition is
often seen as the most important, and is a balancing test between the
economic benefit and the detriment that the restrictions will have on trade.
GOYDER, supra note 29, at 137. However, the burden of proof is on the parties
to the agreement to show that the improvement and progress will happen and
will benefit not only the parties, but also the whole EU. Id. at 138-39.
58. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 627.

The second condition

interprets both the "consumer" element and the "benefit" element broadly.
GOYDER, supra note 29, at 140-41.
59. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 627. For the first negative
condition, the parties to the undertaking need to "show that the individual
restrictions, individually and collectively, are tailored strictly to the valid
purposes of the agreement, and that subsequent damage to the competitive
process does not spill over to wider effect." GOYDER, supra note 29, at 141-42.
The "final condition relates to the external effect of the agreement" and calls
for "market analysis.., on both the product range and the geographic range of
that market." Id. at 144. The Commission will "look[] to the nature of the
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the first two conditions must be affirmative, and the answer to the
second two conditions must be negative.' These four conditions do
not operate as a single balancing test, but are four separate tests
that must all be satisfied.6 '
If three are answered in the
affirmative and one in the negative, there is no leeway for the
Commission to decide that the benefits of allowing the restriction
outweigh the damage. The agreement, decision, or concerted
practice will be automatically prohibited under Article 85(2).62
B. Article 86
While Article 85 deals with agreements and concerted
practices between EU organizations, Article 86 prohibits a
corporation in a dominant EU market position from abusing its
position and affecting trade between Member States.' Under this
Article, the Commission must first determine the corporation's
position in the market.6
If the Commission finds that the
market involved," and "ask whether particular forms of competition exist...
which may be especially damaged by the agreement," such as what may occur
with inter-brand competition. Id.
60. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 136.
61. Id. at 144-45.
62. Id. This is why Article 85(3) cannot be compared with the United
States' "Rule of Reason." Id. American antitrust law is different from EC
competition law. For example, American antitrust law does not prohibit any
practice that may have an effect on competition, only one that "unreasonably
restrict[s] competition." Hefti, supra note 31, at 652. However, Article 85 does
not follow similar reasoning; if a practice may affect competition, then it is
prohibited. Id.
63. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-44. The text of Article 86
reads: "[any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
[Miember-States."
TREATY
CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 627.
"Dominance" is determined based on market power, and is defined as "the
ability to act to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers,
and ultimately of consumers." CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 1444. It is the abuse of dominance that is prohibited, not dominance itself. Id.
64. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-44. To be affected by
Article 86, the corporation must first be determined to hold a dominant
position in the market. Id. To determine whether the corporation holds a
dominant position in the market, the Commission first defines the relevant
market, looking at both the "product market" and the "geographic market."
Id. at 14-44 to 14-45. In reviewing the product market, the Commission uses
"the test of demand substitutability, i.e., the extent to which the demand for
the product may be satisfied by products which are sufficiently similar in
function, price and attributes to be regarded by users as reasonable
substitutes for each other." Id. Factors such as specific use, characteristics
that make a product suitable for a purpose, and price elasticity are all
considered. Id. at 14-45. Meanwhile, the geographic market is decided in
relation to the area of effective competition, which in turn is determined by
defining whether there are barriers to interstate trade and by looking at
"patterns of supply and demand and cross elasticities of supply." Id. at 14-45
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corporation is dominant, then the Commission must examine
whether the corporation is abusing its position.65 This is a twopart analysis; simply finding that a corporation's position is
dominant does not mean that the corporation is abusing its
position.66 As long as the corporation is trying to protect itself, is
not ultimately seeking to "strengthen or abuse a dominant
position," and is using appropriate measures, Article 86 will not
impact the corporation or its activities.67
C. The Merger Regulation
In 1990, the EU Merger Regulation was enacted to cover
mergers [hereinafter concentrations]' that were falling outside the
to 14-46. Once the market has been defined, the Commission can look to the
most important determinant of dominance, market share. Id. at 14-46. The
Commission determines this by "overall size and strength, scale of activities,
strong vertical integration, technological advantages, and intellectual property
rights" of the corporation(s) involved. Id. at 14-46 to 14-47. To be dominant, a
corporation must have the ability to "act independently of competitive forces."
Waller, supra note 38, at 68. The Court has held that a 63% market share
indicates dominance, but a 40% market share will do, if all the other
competitors have small market shares. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note
24, at 14-46.
65. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-44, 14-47. Although
Article 86 does not define "abuse," it does list examples of abusive conduct:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 627-28. To be abusive, it is not
necessary that a company use "economic power." CARSWELL & DE SARRAU,
supra note 24, at 14-47. Also, the abuse does not have to occur in the same
geographic market where the dominant position is possessed if there is at
least some relation between the markets. Id. at 14-47 to 14-48. Some
examples of behavior that the Court of Justice has held to be abusive are:
'refusal to supply, predatory pricing, discriminatory pricing, excessive pricing,
tying, loyalty rebates, exclusive dealing arrangements, [and] refusal to license
intellectual property rights." Id. at 14-48. Article 86 also prohibits the abuse
of a dominant position held jointly by more than one company. Id. at 14-49.
66. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-48 to 14-49.
67. Id.
68. Waller, supra note 38, at 72-73. The term "concentration" is used for a
merger or similar activities, such as certain joint ventures. Id. at 73. A
concentration is said to arise when "(1) two or more previously independent
undertakings merge; or (2) undertakings, or persons already controlling at
least one undertaking, acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or parts
of one or more undertakings." CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 1480. In transactions not involving mergers, the operation will be deemed a
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reach of Articles 85 and 86.69 It was intended to replace Articles 85
and 86 as the "only instrument" applicable to concentrations at the
Community-wide level. 7°
Under the Merger Regulation, the
Commission is given the power to prevent the creation of any
concentration of undertakings that either creates or empowers a
dominant position in the EU.7 ' In the event of any "merger,
acquisition, joint venture agreement,... announcement of a public
bid, or... acquisition of a controlling interest," the undertaking or
corporation must notify the Commission within one week. 7' The
Commission has an initial thirty days to determine whether the
transaction is subject to its Merger Regulation, and if it finds that
the transaction is subject to the regulation, it has another four
months to investigate and determine whether to invalidate the
proposed concentration.7 ' Of course, if the transaction does not fall
under
the regulation, it may nonetheless be affected by Article
74
85.

concentration if there is control. Id. at 14-81.
69. Waller, supra note 38, at 72-73. The Commission may "block any
concentration that creates or strengthens a dominant position within the
Community." Id. at 74. The Commission will analyze a concentration that
satisfies certain threshold requirements:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than 2,500 million ECU; (b) in each of at least three
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than 100 million ECU; (c) in each of at
least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the
turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than
twenty-five million ECU each; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more
than one hundred million ECU, unless each of the undertakings
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Communitywide turnover within a single Member State.
GOYDER, supra note 29, at 389 (emphasis added). "Aggregate turnover" is the
amount the undertakings have earned from their ordinary business activities
in the previous financial year, after taxes. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra
note 24, at 14-78. The term "ECU" stands for "European Currency Unit" and
was used as a valuation prior to the introduction of the euro. BEAUMONT &
WALKER, supra note 15, at 17-19.
70. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-98.
71. Waller, supra note 38, at 74.
72. Id. at 75.
73. Id. The Commission can decide that the activity is not within the
Merger Regulation, or that it falls under the Merger Regulation but "does not
raise serious questions as to its compatibility with the common market." Id.
The Commission can also decide to begin proceedings because the activity falls
within the Merger Regulation and there are serious issues of whether it is
compatible with the common market. Id. If the Commission institutes
proceedings, it then has four months to investigate and "invalidate" a proposed
concentration. Id.
74. Id. at 73.
If the concentration does not satisfy the threshold
requirements for the Merger Regulation, then it falls to the national courts of
the Member States to determine whether it violates the national competition
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II. ANALYSIS OF Eu COMPETITION LAW

The EU has developed a very sophisticated system of
competition law, especially considering that the EU has existed
only since 1957.75 The system of law is continually changing and
growing. 6 This is evident from treaties subsequent to the Treaty
of Rome7 7 and from the regulations that have been enacted to
provide for inadequacies in the current law of the EU. 8
Accordingly, the EU has shown that it is willing to amend its
current laws whenever there is a need for change. 9 The new age
of a single currency market may signify a need for amendments by
the EU.80
The first step in deciding whether a change in EU law is
necessary is to analyze what steps the Commission will take when
there is a hostile takeover attempt. The second step is to
determine whether the actions taken by the Commission could
discourage a corporation from pursuing a hostile takeover. This
also requires a determination whether the Commission's actions
could affect the tactics that the corporations may use in
attempting and defending against a hostile takeover.
A. Articles 85 and 86

Although Articles 85 and 86 govern most of the competition
laws. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-95. The national
competition laws of the Member States for the most part closely resemble
Articles 85(1) and 86. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 519.
75. Waller, supra note 38, at 55-56. The competition law of the EU was
first adopted in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Id.
76. Id. at 56-57, 77.
77. HARTLEY, supra note 13 at 6-8.
78. Id. at 72-73; Hefti, supra note 31, at 616-17, 629-30. Examples of
regulations enacted to supplement the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht are
Regulation 17 and the Merger Regulation. Id. at 629-30. An analysis of
Regulation 17 is beyond the scope of this Comment.
79. Articles 85 and 86, the basis of competition law in the EU, were adopted
in 1957, and although they remain unchanged, the subsequent regulations
adopted (such as Regulation 17 and the Merger Regulation) have exposed
deficiencies in the Articles. Yet, the fact that changes were made pursuant to
problems discovered in the law demonstrates that the EU is willing to make
changes for the better when needed.
80. As discussed in the Introduction of this Comment, the new single
currency has brought about a new kind of market and a new way of thinking
because of the new risks the euro creates. The new trend of hostile takeovers,
through the use of dirty tactics, has arrived in the EU, but there is no
legislation to discourage or punish any of these tactics. See TREATY
CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 626-28 (failing to enumerate in Articles 85
and 86 the types of behavior that can lead to possible violation of the Articles);
Waller, supra note 38, at 73-76 (discussing the Merger Regulation, which only
governs when violations occur, but does not provide for underlying activities in
forming concentrations). For this reason, it is time for the EU to again amend
its current laws to discourage and control this new trend.
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issues that arise, the EU has found it difficult to apply them to
mergers and acquisitions." Prior to the adoption of the Merger
Regulation, the Commission used Article 86 to control
concentrations between dominant firms, but did so with limited
success because many loopholes existed. 8' The Commission used
Article 85 to try to fill in the gaps as best as possible. 8
Because Articles 85 and 86 were not completely effective in
regulating concentrations, the Commission convinced the Council
to adopt the Merger Regulation.'
Since then, the Merger
Regulation
has
been
controlling
in
cases
involving
concentrations."
However, even though Articles 85 and 86 no
81. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-70 to 14-71. The main
reason is that the Treaty of Rome and subsequent Treaty of Maastricht never
provided for merger (concentration) control. Id. at 14-70.
82. Id. at 14-70 to 14-71. Until the enactment of the Merger Regulation,
Article 86 usually applied to concentrations. Id. at 14-70. In the landmark
1973 case Continental Can, the Court held that Article 86 prohibited a
dominant firm from acquiring a majority position in a competing corporation
because the effect would impair effective competition.
Case 6/72,
EuropemballageCorp & ContinentalCan Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 199,
245. The Court declared, after looking at "the spirit, structure and working of
Article 86," that the "strengthening [of a dominant] position of an undertaking
[through a merger] may be abusive and prohibited by Article 86 ....
" Id. at
243, 245. However, Article 86 was never a fully effective solution, because
when the corporations are not initially dominant, Article 86 cannot prevent a
merger or acquisition, but only subsequent activities by the new enlarged
corporation. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-70 to 14-71. There

was also a question as to whether Article 86 would apply to mergers and
acquisitions that did not lead to market shares large enough to resemble a
monopoly. Id. at 14-71. However, possibly the greatest problem was in
enforcement, because there was no requirement of notification prior to a
merger or concentration, nor could the Commission suspend any activity while
it investigated the matter. Id. at 14-72.
83. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-73. In British Am.
Tobacco Co. & Reynolds Indus. v. Commission, the court stated that:
Article 85(1) may apply to the acquisition of a minority shareholding
when (1) the acquiror gains de facto or de jure control over the target
undertaking; (2) the minority acquisition is part of a long-term plan
leading to the reinforcement of the minority investment in, or the
complete take-over of, a competitor; or (3) the arrangement gives rise to
a structure of cooperation between the acquiror and the other party.
Id. at 14-72 (discussing Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, British Am. Tobacco
Co. & Reynolds Indus. v.Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 24 (1988)). However, the
case still left open the question of whether Article 85 could apply to majority
acquisitions or hostile takeovers. Id. at 14-72 to 14-73. Thus, until the
Merger Regulation was enacted, the Commission tried to apply Article 85 to
concentrations by using the risk of collusion, and to force informal settlements.
Id. at 14-73.
84. Waller, supra note 38, at 72-73. The Merger Regulation went into effect
in September 1990, id. at 72, and from then on was intended to be the "only
instrument" applicable to concentrations, at the Community-wide level.
CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-98.
85. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-98.
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longer apply to concentrations that are sufficient to satisfy the
requirements under the Merger Regulation, the Articles may still
be used by national courts' when they have to decide
Accordingly, understanding both the
concentration issues.87
Articles themselves and how they are applied is still important.
The discussion of how Articles 85 and 86 affect national legislation
will be addressed in Part III.
B. ScenarioA: Evaluation Under the Merger Regulation
Suppose that Corporation A is planning to mount a hostile
takeover of Corporation B. Neither corporation holds a dominant
position in the market as prohibited by Article 86. However, the
merging of the two corporations would result in the new
corporation holding a dominant market position in the EU, for
example, a fifty percent market share.
Under the Merger Regulation, once Corporation A has
acquired a controlling position or has publicly announced a bid, it
must notify the Commission of its action within one week.8 The
Commission has thirty days to determine whether this takeover
attempt falls under the regulation.89 For the Merger Regulation to
apply, the threshold requirement is that the two corporations
together have sufficient "community dimension.""° That is, if two
corporations conduct a significant amount of business both
worldwide and Community-wide, without too much activity
centered within any one Member State, the corporations have a
sufficient presence in the EU to constitute community dimension. 9'
Once sufficient community dimension has been exhibited, the
next step in the Commission's analysis is to determine whether

86. Id. at 14-95. The Commission has jurisdiction over all competition
matters, but when an issue does not satisfy the threshold levels, then it falls to
the national courts of the individual Member States to decide the matter. Id.
at 14-95 to 14-96. The national courts must comply with EU law. Id.
87. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 423. If a concentration is not sufficiently
large to satisfy the requirements under the Merger Regulation, then the issue
will fall to the national courts. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 1499. Because only the Commission and the Court of Justice apply the Merger

Regulation, the national courts instead apply their own competition laws,
which usually resemble Articles 85 or 86. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 422-23.
It is more likely that Article 86 would be used to block concentrations in the
national courts because it can be applied immediately, whereas with Article
85, the Commission must first analyze the situation under section 85(3). Id.
at 423.
88. Waller, supra note 38, at 75.
89. Id.
90. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-77. But see GOYDER,
supra note 69, at 389 (providing different requirements needed to satisfy
"community dimension").
91. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-77 to 14-79.
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the concentration is within the scope of the regulation.' Because
Corporation A has acquired a direct controlling position in
Corporation B through the purchase of Corporation B's shares, the
takeover attempt involves a concentration that is within the scope
of the Merger Regulation.93 The Commission then has four months
to investigate the takeover94 and determine whether it is
"compatible with the Common Market."95 The two corporations
together would constitute a fifty percent market share, and
therefore would be in a dominant market position, so the
Commission may conclude that the new corporation impedes
effective competition within the EU, depending, of course, on other
market factors.96
If the Commission finds that the takeover violates the Merger
92. Id. at 14-80. A concentration is within the scope of the regulation if
there is a merger between two or more previously independent corporations, or
when a corporation acquires direct or indirect control of all or part of another
corporation. Id. "Control" includes "(a) ownership of the right to use all or
part of the assets of an undertaking; [or] (b) rights or contracts which confer
decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of [the
corporation]." Id. at 14-81.
93. Id.
94. Waller, supra note 38, at 75.
95. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-82. The issue is whether
"a concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of

which effective competition is significantly impeded in the Common Market or
a substantial part thereof." Id. As in the application of Article 86, the
Commission looks to both the product and geographic markets to determine
the economic power of the merging corporations. Id. To then determine
whether this economic power creates a dominant position which will impede
effective competition, the Commission takes into account:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the
Common Market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the
markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from
undertakings located either within or out with the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their
economic and financial power, the opportunities available to suppliers

and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and
services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and
the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is
to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
Id. at 14-84 to 14-85. The Commission also gives major consideration to the
market share that the concentration would have following the merger. Id. at
14-85.
96. Id. "However, a higher market share does not necessarily lead to
dominance." Id. In one case, the Commission held that although the
concentration would have resulted in a market share of 54% in France and
48% in Portugal, the high market shares would not allow the newly merged
corporations to prevent "effective competition" from other companies. Id. The
Commission also noted that the market was "highly competitive" in price and
in terms of innovations, so although the concentration would result in a
dominant position in terms of market share, this would in no way reduce
effective competition. Id.
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Regulation, then the Commission could refuse to allow the
takeover to occur, and could instead force a separation of the
assets already combined.97 Thus, in the current scenario, if the
takeover were found to violate the Merger Regulation, Corporation
A would not be required to pay any damages to Corporation B, but
the takeover would not be allowed to proceed.98 Corporation A
would lose the time, money and manpower it expended in the
attempted acquisition, but it would not cost the corporation money
in the form of damages.99 As a result, Corporation A could sell the
shares of Corporation B that it had acquired without being any
worse off. Of course, if the Commission were to find that effective
competition would not be impacted by Corporation A's acquisition
of Corporation B, the attempted acquisition would be allowed to
proceed despite A and B's dominant market share."
Consequently, Corporation A has nothing substantial to lose by
attempting the takeover, but much to gain if it is allowed to
proceed.'
Thus, the Merger Regulation, while effective in prohibiting
concentrations that will harm competition, does not appear to
discourage corporations that are considering a hostile takeover.
Moreover, along with the absence of penalties for takeover
attempts that violate the Merger Regulation, there are no
penalties for particularly underhanded methods of attempting
hostile takeovers. 102 When comparing the potential benefit of
acquiring a corporation to the potential detriment, which includes
only a possibility of fines, 0 ' the hostile corporation has a strong
97. Id. at 14-95. The Commission can refuse to allow the concentration to
take place, and in the case of an operating concentration, the Commission can

force a separation of the assets or order any other action that will re-establish
conditions of effective competition. Id. The Commission also has the power to
impose fines for any failures to notify or cooperate in the investigation. Id.
98. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-51. The Commission is

allowed to impose administrative fines, which it would more likely impose in
the instance of a blatant attempt to create dominance and affect competition,
or penalty payments, which would be imposed for failure to comply with the
investigation or decision of the Commission. Id. at 14-51, 14-95. However, the
Commission has no power to award damages to injured parties. Id. at 14-51.
Only the national courts have that power. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 14-95.
101. Even if the concentration were held to be in violation of the Merger
Regulation, and Corporation A were required to pay a fine, it would still own
the stock of Corporation B, which it could sell, most probably, for a profit. The
stock price would most likely rise, since Corporation B would no longer be the
target of a hostile takeover. However, if the Commission were to hold that
this was not a violation, Corporation A stands to gain much in the acquisition

of new undertaking.
102. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-98.
103. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 521. While the Commission cannot impose
any damages, if the concentration does not satisfy the requirements of the
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incentive to use whatever means it deems necessary to acquire the
target corporation.
C. Scenario B: Failingto Meet the Threshold Requirements of the
Merger Regulation
If Corporation A and Corporation B together did not have
sufficient aggregate worldwide or Community-wide turnover, or
received two-thirds of their business from one Member State, then
the concentration would not satisfy the threshold requirement of
having community dimension."° When a concentration does not
fall under the Merger Regulation due to lack of community
dimension, the Member State or States in which the concentration
is located have sole discretion to examine the concentration. °5
Neither Article 85 or 86 of the EU nor the Merger Regulation
apply; review of the activity falls outside of the Commission's°
hands and into the jurisdiction of the individual Member States) 0
Thus, since the competition policies of the individual Member
States can vary as long as their policies do not conflict with the
enforcement of the EU competition law, multiple and conflicting
laws have arisen, each with the possibility of affecting a situation
differently."

III. Eu LAws VS. LAws OF THE MEMBER STATES
Each of the Member States of the EU has also adopted
national laws that relate to competition, usually closely
resembling Article 85(1) and (2) and Article 862" EU law readily
accommodates the individual competition policies of the Member
States, as long as those policies do not conflict with EU
competition law."° In case of a conflict, the EU competition law is
supreme.10
Merger Regulation and is thus analyzed under national law, the national

courts have the ability to require the hostile corporation to pay damages. Id.
at 514.
104. Id. at 386. See supra note 69 for a definition of community dimension.
105. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-95. Thus, if the Merger
Regulation does not apply to a concentration, then national legislation of the
Member State- State applies. Id.
106. Id.
107. Waller, supra note 18, at 354. See supra note 18 (discussing the
differences between Dutch law and French law with regard to regulating
takeover tactics).
108. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-8. The national
competition laws are usually based on, and very similar to, if not the same as,
Article 85(1) and (2) and Article 86. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 519.
109. CARWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-8.
110. Id. When there are any conflicts, the Court of Justice has held that the
'parallel application of the national system can only be allowed in so far as it
does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of
the Community rules . . . and of the full effect of the measures adopted in
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Because the national laws are modeled after the EU Articles
85 and 86, there are no direct conflicts."' However, problems
remain because the Articles leave loopholes open."' When a
concentration does not satisfy the threshold of the Merger
Regulation, it is sent to the Member States for a determination of
whether the concentration violates the national competition
laws." However, when the analysis is done under the Member
States' adoptions of Articles 85(1) and 86, the same problems arise
as did at the Community-wide level before the enactment of the
Merger Regulation, because these Articles are not designed to
recognize and control mergers that may affect competition."'
Thus, Member States' competition laws should be changed so that
mergers which will affect competition can be recognized and
stopped.
While EU law is supreme when a conflict of law arises, if the
EU is silent in an area of law that a Member State has addressed,
the Member State's law will apply within that State."' The policy
behind this rule is to help each Member State keep its autonomy16
within the context of economic integration of the Community.
Currently, the EU's competition laws do not regulate the tactics
and defenses that may be used during takeover attempts.
Therefore, each Member State is free to enact its own laws in this
area,"1 which has led to problems. In the Gucci/LVMH case, for
example, Gucci used the liberal Dutch laws to increase its defenses
against LVMH's takeover attempt. 9
Because Gucci was
registered in the Netherlands, these defenses were available to it.
However, if Gucci had been registered in France, the same
defenses would not have been available."' The reason for the
differences in law is due to the differences in history and culture
among the Member States."' For example, the French and the
implementation of those rules." Id. Thus, EU law requires that the national
competition laws give way to EU competition laws. Id.

111. Id. at 14-8.
112. See supra footnotes 81 to 84 and accompanying text for an explanation

of the loopholes left open by Articles 85 and 86.
113. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-95.

114. Id. at 14-70.
115. Waller, supra note 18, at 354.
116. Dixon, supra note 1, at 17. However, the EU is aware that there is now

a need for uniform takeover laws. Id.
117. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-09. If the EU is silent on
an issue, then the Member States' law is controlling. Id.
118. Waller, supra note 18, at 345.
119. Kamm, supra note 9, at A12. See supra note 18 (discussing the

difference in takeover regulations between France and the Netherlands).
120. Kamm, supra note 9, at A12.

121. Andre R.Fiebig, The German Federal Cartel Office and the Application
of Competition Law in Reunified Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 373, 389-

90 (1993).
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Germans have very different ideas concerning the policy behind
competition law and what role it should play in business." The
EU competition law is closer to France's view, and thus friction is
created when EU law applies in Germany." 3
Because there are no uniform takeover regulations
throughout the EU governing what tactics and defenses may be
During a
used in a hostile takeover, problems may arise.'
takeover attempt, the national laws of the country in which the
target corporation is registered apply.2 2 Because some Member
States' laws are more liberal than others', a takeover attempt
could have drastically different results depending upon the State
law that is governing.12 6 For example, if a certain Member State's
laws apply, and these laws allow a greater variety of defensive
tactics, a hostile corporation may be deterred from launching a
takeover attempt.2 7 Thus, competition law becomes a game of
forum-shopping.
However, if uniform laws prohibiting some of the more
egregious tactics were enacted by the EU, inconsistent legislation
of the Member States would be preempted, and the law would then

122. Id. The French view of competition law is that it is a means for
reaching economic goals, while the German view holds that competition law
should only maintain the competitive order. Id. at 390. Germany strictly
restricts the use of competition law as a means of "achiev[ing] specific public
policy goals." Id.
123. Id. at 401-02. For example, Germany is "frustrated" with the Merger
Regulation, which it feels "represents a victory of industrial policy over
competition policy." Id. at 401. In the Merger Regulation, a clause referred to
as the "French clause" instructs the Commission to take into account the
competition of other corporations located outside of the Community when
deciding whether the merger should be allowed. Id. at 402. Germany feels
that this brings politics into what should be an objective decision-making
process. Id.
124. Dixon, supra note 1, at 17. Since in the past hostile takeovers have not
been prevalent in the EU, and rarely crossed national lines, Community laws
never developed controls. Id. Moreover, when hostile takeovers did occur in
the past, underhanded tactics, such as those now emerging, were not as
prevalent. Id. Therefore, historically, there was no reason to enact uniform
Community-wide laws to control the methods used by hostile corporations. Id.
However, there is a new trend of hostile takeovers that often cross national
lines, and hostile corporations are using new tactics of questionable legality.
Id. For example, the "creeping takeover" technique that LVMH used to
acquire a majority share of Gucci, though not found by the Dutch court to
violate any law, is an illegal tactic in France, where a corporation must make
a bid once it acquires over thirty-three percent of another corporation. Kamm,
supra note 9, at A12.
125. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-9.
126. Kamm, supra note 9, at A12. For example, if Gucci had been registered
in France, LVMH would have made a bid when it acquired thirty-four percent,
and the defensive tactics that Gucci used in this case would not have been
available to it under French law. Id.
127. See supra note 126 for an example of this.
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be clear for everyone. Hostile corporations pondering a takeover
attempt would know what type of tactics were allowed. Similarly,
target corporations would know in advance what defenses were
available to them. A uniform law would prevent situations like
that which occurred in the Gucci/LVMH case, where the two
corporations went to court a number of times simply to determine
the legality of certain tactics.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR NEW LEGISLATION
The Member States added a protocol in the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam to help determine when Community-wide legislation
is needed on a certain issue, or whether the Member States should
be allowed to enact their own laws."2 The protocol is called the
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity2 9 and
Proportionality. 3" Generally, the view in the EU has been that the
Community has the power to make law only when it is clearly
necessary."' However, this principle is only applicable to areas
where the Community and the Member States share concurrent
powers.'
The Commission has listed areas of law which are
128. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 51 (1999) [hereinafter HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS]. The

Treaty of Amsterdam was enacted in 1997, and went into effect in 1998. Id.
The treaty was enacted to further the movement of the EU toward one union.
HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 8. For example, it has set the stage for the
eventual abolition of all entry controls for people traveling between Member
States. Id.
129. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 128, at 84-85. The
Principle of Subsidiarity is that the Member States should retain power, and
Community action should be treated as an exception that is used only when
necessary. Id. at 84. This principle was introduced to the Community in
Article 3b(5) of the Treaty of Maastricht, which reads in part:
[iun areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.
Id. at 85. The reasoning is that the EU covers a large area that includes
differences in language, politics, geography, religion, language, and culture,
and so the individual Member States are better able to provide for their own
citizens than would a mass Community-wide rule. Id.
130. Id. at 86-87.
131. Id. at 84-86. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, Community-wide action
is justified when 1) the issue has transnational aspects that the Member
States alone could not satisfactorily regulate, 2) lack of Community action
would either fail to satisfy requirements of the Treaty, or would cause
significant damage to Member States' interests, or 3) Community action would
benefit both the EU and the Member States more than individual Member
State's actions. Id. at 87.
132. Id. at 86. The Treaty does not specify what areas of law are concurrent
between the Member States and the Community, but the Commission declares

20001

CompetitionLaws of the European Union

within the exclusive mandate of the Community.'
Included in
this list is competition law."u Therefore, the Commission has the
power to enact new legislation in this area, and its legislation will
overrule any conflicting national legislation that the Member
States may enact.3 5
The EU seeks to create a common economic market through
harmonious and uniform policies in order to promote its basic
purpose, which is to create a unity among the Member States.13
For matters that eminently affect this single market, uniformity of
law is especially important.'37 The EU has always viewed a strong
and uniform competition policy as an important means of
accomplishing its goals."
This is illustrated by the EU's
enactment of Articles 85 and 86, and its subsequent enactment of
the Merger Regulation.39 As the market changes, EU competition
laws must respond and change in order to ensure that vital
uniformity remains. 4 ' This Comment proposes that due to recent
changes in the European market, the EU should: 1) extend the
Merger Regulation so that the national courts must apply it; and
2) create a takeover regulation that governs what practices are.
acceptable during mergers, especially when a hostile takeover is
involved.

what areas of law are exclusively within the competence of the Community.
Id.
133. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 128, at 86. Areas

include "the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital; [and] the common commercial policy; the general rules
on competition...." Id. at n.8. The Commission has said that, as new areas
emerge within the EU which require exclusive competence of the Community

as opposed to the individual Member States having power, it will add those
areas to the list. Id. at 86.
134. Id. at n.8.
135. Id. at 84-86. See also CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-8
(discussing that where conflict exists between the EU competition laws and
the national competition laws, the national laws must give way to the EU
competition laws).
136. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 588.
137. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note

128,

at

92.

Competition is key to the single EU market, as is uniformity of the
competition laws among the Member States. Id. at 86, 92. If some countries
have more lax laws than others, it will encourage forum shopping in that
corporations would rather register themselves in those countries. Id. at 93.
This may result in hostility and contention between the Member States, and
eventually an increase in trade barriers. Id.
138. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 587.
139. Waller, supra note 38, at 55. The underlying reason for EU competition
law is to promote the goals of the EU in breaking down the national
boundaries of Member States, in turn creating a unified common market. Id.
140. Id. at 55-58.
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A. Extension of the Merger Regulation
As currently written, the Merger Regulation is only applied at
the Community level to concentrations that satisfy the
requirements of the regulation.1 4 ' The transactions that fail to
satisfy the requirements are sent to the Member States, and the
national courts analyze the transactions under their own laws.
The reason for this is that the provisions of the Merger Regulation
are only deemed to apply to a certain level of concentrations that
will affect Community-wide competition. 143 Smaller concentrations
are deemed not to affect the Community, so national laws are
applied to determine whether competition in one or more Member
States is affected.'" In fact, in 1998 the threshold requirements
for falling under the Merger Regulation were raised in order to
decrease the workload of the Commission by causing more cases to
fall into national jurisdictions. 4' However, most national courts do
not have specific laws designed to prevent small-scale
concentrations that may affect competition.1 46 As discussed in
Parts I and II of this Comment, the reason that the Merger
Regulation was enacted was because of the deficiencies in Articles
85 and 86 with regard to governing transactions, such as mergers,
that affect competition.'
For this reason, the Commission should extend the Merger
Regulation so that the same standards for determining whether a
transaction will constitute a concentration that affects competition
will also apply in the national courts, regardless of the scale of the
concentration. In this way, transactions that do not constitute a
Community concentration could still be found to constitute a
concentration within one or more Member States that affects
competition. The national courts could, as the Commission can on
a Community level, "block any concentration that creates or
strengthens a dominant position within the [Member State(s)].
With the law written this way, the Commission would still be

141. See supra notes 68 and 69 for a list of the requirements needed for a
concentration to fall under the Merger Regulation.
142. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-95, 14-8.
143. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 389.
144. CARSWELL & DE SARRAu, supra note 24, at 14-95.
145. GOYDER, supra note 29, at 389.
146. See id. at 424 (discussing how national competition laws are based on
and are very similar to Articles 85 and 86); CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra

note 24, at 14-71 (discussing the problems in applying Articles 85 and 86 to
concentrations). However, each Member State could adopt laws that are
similar to the Merger Regulation. Id. at 14-8. For example, on January 1,
1998, the Dutch Competition Act took effect in the Netherlands, which
included a merger control provision based on the EU Merger Control. Lisa
Brownlee, Netherlands, 33 INT'L LAW. 705, 705-06 (1999).
147. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-71.
148. Waller, supra note 38, at 74.

2000]

Competition Laws of the European Union

notified first and would have thirty days to make its initial
decision. If the Commission decided that the transaction did not
constitute a concentration, or that it did, but was harmless to
Community-wide competition, the process would shift to the
national courts of Member States. The national courts would then
have the option of determining if the transaction constitutes a
concentration on a smaller scale that would effect competition
within a Member State or between any Member States. If a
national court found that competition would be affected, then the
court could block the transaction from proceeding and order the
breakup of the concentration. This would eliminate the loopholes
that exist in Articles 85 and 86 with regard to mergers and
acquisitions.
In 1998, the Netherlands enacted the Dutch Competition
Act." 9 The Dutch Competition Act replaced the earlier act of 1956
and modeled its competition laws after those of the EU."' As was
to be expected, the Articles that deal with antitrust and abuse of
dominant positions are almost exact replicas of Articles 85 and 86
of the EU."' However, the Dutch Competition Act also contains a
provision for merger control, which states that the Act:
applies to all legal and/or economic concentrations that do not have
a community dimension within the meaning of the EC competition
law. Not only must these concentrations possess a combined
aggregate revenue of NLG 250 million, but two of the undertakings
concerned must also have a revenue that exceeds NLG 30 million in
the Netherlands.
Because these threshold criteria apply to
aggregate world-wide revenue and [are not limited to] revenue
realized in the Netherlands, the merger control provisions of the
Competition Act are not limited
52 to combinations or mergers that
take place in the Netherlands.
The Dutch Competition Act, therefore, is an example of what
this Comment proposes. The Netherlands based its merger control
provisions on the Merger Regulation, but on a smaller scale. The
Dutch Competition Act provides for smaller amounts of aggregate
world-wide revenue, and a stipulated nation-wide aggregate
revenue amount. The Commission of the European Union must
issue a directive..8 instructing all of the Member States to enact
such merger control provisions. However, the Member States
149. Brownlee, supra note 146, at 705.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 705-06.
153. A directive is one of the five kinds of acts that may be adopted by the
four governing bodies of the EU. HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 99. Directives
are issued to Member States, and are binding only "as to the result to be

achieved[,]" but leave "the choice of form and methods" to the national
governments.

Id.

(citations omitted).

inconsistent national legislation. Id. at 219.

Directives have supremacy over
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should each have the autonomy to decide what amounts to set for
the necessary aggregate revenue.
B. Creationof a Takeover Regulation
The existing competition laws of the EU are silent as to what
behavior and tactics are allowed during mergers and takeover
attempts.'5 Because the Commission has not spoken on this issue,
the Member States are free to enact their own legislation."5
However, allowing Member States to enact their own laws
decreases uniformity of competition laws throughout the
Community."60 This encourages forum-shopping by corporations
that are seeking to find Member States with either the least
restrictive or most restrictive allowances concerning takeover
tactics." 7
In effect, individual legislation negatively affects
competition because it encourages forum-shopping and it leads to
a more barbaric common market.
The EU must enact a new regulation that clearly defines the
types of practices that are permissible and prohibited with regard
to mergers and acquisitions of interest in corporations.
It is
important that this be a uniform regulation. The EU should not
leave discretion to the Member States since lack of uniformity
would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Because the EU law is
supreme in the area of competition law, this regulation would
prevail over any conflicting legislation of the Member States." In
this way, two important policy interests would be satisfied: 1)
there would be increased uniformity of competition laws
throughout the EU; and 2) the regulation would mark the
"implement[ation of a] common polic[y] ...to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious and balanced development of
economic activities ...."159
For example, the creeping takeover tactic that LVMH used on
154. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 588; Waller, supra note 38, at
58-76.
155. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-9.
156. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 128, at 92-93.

157. Id. With less uniformity of competition laws, Member States may also
be less willing to drop all trade barriers. Id. Also, when there are loopholes in

the laws of one Member State, corporations may flock there to take advantage
of the gaps in the law, which may create animosity between Member States.
Id.
158. CARSWELL & DE SARRAU, supra note 24, at 14-8. In a conflict between
national competition laws and EU competition laws, EU law is supreme to
prevent "prejudic[ing] the uniform application throughout the common market
of the Community rules. . . ." Id. (citations omitted).
159. TREATY CONSOLIDATED, supra note 22, at 588 (quoting Article 2 of the

Treaty of Maastricht, which sets out the goals of establishing the European
Community); see HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 128, at

92-93 (discussing the importance and desire to have uniformity in matters
that affect the common market).
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Gucci would have been illegal in France, as well as in all other
Member States with more restrictive takeover laws.'"
The
corporate world generally regards this tactic as underhanded and
somewhat dishonest, as compared to when a corporation makes a
bid after it has acquired a certain percentage of a target
corporation's stock."6 ' The EU may decide to set a threshold
percentage of stock which, when passed, would require a
corporation to launch a bid. However, this threshold must be
uniform throughout the EU. Allowing the individual Member
States to adopt their own threshold percentages of stock would not
sufficiently guarantee uniformity.
The essence of this proposal is that uniformity must exist
among all the Member States with regard to takeover rules. 62 The
EU sees a need for competition laws, and yet it allows the Member
States to enact their own laws in this regard. With the new face of
European business emerging under the single currency, the EU
must enact uniform controls to regulate the recent takeover trend.
CONCLUSION
There are currently many changes occurring in the EU's
market atmosphere with the introduction of the euro and the
resulting creation of a single market. Along with these changes,
hostile takeovers are becoming a trend in the market, and hostile
corporations are adopting a new "anything goes" mentality in
order to win their battles against target corporations. Because
these changes are so recent, the current EU competition laws are
inefficient to control both the spread of takeovers and the tactics
that corporations are using. This is apparent from the facts
surrounding LVMH's recent takeover attempt of Gucci. Neither
corporation appeared to know what tactics and defenses were
legal, and as a result, the two corporations went to court a number
of times to fight over the legality of various takeover strategies
and defenses.
Most Member States are still acting under Articles 85 and 86
with regard to all national competition matters. Yet these Articles
were not designed to detect mergers and acquisitions that may
affect competition. For this reason, the EU must issue a directive
instructing the Member States to enact merger controls based on

160. Kamm, supra note 9, at A12.
161. Id.
162. This proposal is for uniformity, and the creation of a new regulation

governing takeovers. However, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to
determine the regulation, and which tactics and defenses will be legal. For
further reading on individual takeover strategies and defenses, see generally
GAUGHAN, supra note 6 and STANLEY FOSTER REED & ALEXANDRA REED
LAJOUX, THE ART OF M&A: A MERGER ACQUISITION BUYOUT GUIDE (2d ed.

1995).
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the EU Merger Regulation. In this way, the EU or the national
governments can detect and break up concentrations that are not
large enough or strong enough to affect competition on a
Community-wide level, but which still may affect competition on a
national level, or between two Member States.
The EU must also create a standardized takeover regulation
that addresses the takeover tactics and defenses that the EU
would allow during hostile takeovers.
This would increase
uniformity in the EU and would decrease the forum-shopping that
occurs due to inconsistencies among Member States' national laws.
This uniformity of reformation would also allow for a smootherrunning common market that would be more in line with the
purposes set forth in the creation of the EU.

